Attempt by officials of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to obtain
missile technology in Ukraine
47. It was publicly reported in June 2012 that the Ukrainian Security Services
prevented an attempt by two nationals of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to obtain classified missile design materials. Corroborating information provided by Ukrainian and Belarus authorities shows that these two individuals, Ryu Song-Chol and Ri Thae-Gil, were officials of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
accredited to its Trade Representative Office in Belarus (see passports in annex X).
48. In 2011, Ryu and Ri travelled to Ukraine and approached an employee of the
State-owned Yuzhnoye Design Office (an entity formerly engaged in the development of medium-range to intercontinental ballistic missiles and now developing space launcher vehicles)34
to obtain photographs of secret academic theses.35
According toUkrainian authorities, these would have provided the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea with information on advanced technologies and new forms of technological processes for the design of missile systems, liquid-propellant engines, spacecraft and missile fuel supply systems and associated computer programmes. The Ukrainian national having reported this approach, the Ukraine Security Services arrested Ryu and Ri in the middle of a prearranged delivery. Both were sentenced in May 2012 to terms of imprisonment of eight years.
49. Officials and diplomats of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea have been
involved in illicit activities even before the imposition of sanctions. Between 1993
and 1998, while he was the representative of the country to IAEA, Yun Ho-Jin (who was designated by the Committee in July 2009), was running an illicit procurement network and conducting other illicit and criminal activities out of his country’s
embassy in Vienna. It is regularly reported that intelligence officers of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea working under diplomatic cover in Berlin are particularly interested in acquiring technology and technical know-how about metal processing.36
It is highly likely that similar activities are conducted out of the country’s other
embassies, diplomatic missions and commercial and trade missions abroad.
50. Diplomats of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or officials
travelling on diplomatic or service passports,37
have also been involved in numerous violations of the arms embargo. A diplomat and a KPA Senior Colonel travelling under diplomatic status (see annex XVII, sects. D and E) were involved in the illicit refurbishment of armoured vehicles and other military equipment in the Congo and used diplomatic bank accounts to transfer funds (see paras. 99 and 100). Documents related to Michael Ranger’s attempt to broker Democratic People’s Republic of Korea ________________________
Yuzhnoye Design Office, www.yuzhnoye.com.
The theses were entitled “Methods for predicting the capability of capillary intakes in fuel tanks
of motor assemblies for spacecraft” and “Hydrodynamic processes in fuel tanks of spacecraft”.
See the 2008 annual report on the protection of the Constitution of the Federal Ministry of the Interior of Germany (pp. 273 and 274), www.bmi.bund.de.
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is known to have four types of passports: diplomatic passports, service passports, official (travel) passports and ordinary passports. Diplomatic passports are issued to diplomats, high-level officials (Vice-Minister or higher) of the Foreign Ministry and KWP and its subordinate offices. Service passports are issued to government officials other than diplomats working at embassies or trade representative offices. Official (travel) passports are issued to citizens of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea travelling or working abroad on official duty, including athletes and national company employees. Ordinarypassports require special permission from the Government and are seldom issued.
man-portable air defence systems to Azerbaijan show that O Hak-Chol, his main
contact in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, was travelling under a diplomatic passport at least until 2004 and probably later (see para. 91). Diplomats of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea were also involved in several violations of the luxury goods embargo, including the export of eight Mercedes Benz vehicles from Austria and the attempt to export two yachts from Italy (see paras. 84 and 85 of S/2012/422).
51. In accordance with paragraph 24 of resolution 2094 (2013), countries hosting
embassies, permanent missions or trade representative offices of the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea (see annex XI) should be particularly vigilant regarding
its diplomats and officials. As shown in the Ukraine case, neighbouring countries
should also be vigilant if they share a common travel area.
Transporter-erector-launchers observed during the April 2012 military parade